Ukraine hits ammunition depots with domestic weapons in an attempt to disrupt Russia’s logistics

Over the past several months, the war had gradually moved deep inside Russian territory.
In September, Ukraine targeted depots in the Russian towns of Tikhoretsk and Toropets with drones, setting ablaze over 30,000 tons of ammunition, which allegedly included ballistic missiles.
The warehouse in Toropets was supposed to withstand a nuclear strike, as promised by the Russian authorities, but it failed to cope with Ukraine-produced drones.
Ukrainian strikes destroy weapons, and the Kremlin’s logistics, which, when damaged in the rear, stall Russia’s operations on the front line.
Michael Bohnert, a licensed engineer at RAND research organization, told the Kyiv Independent that there are a variety of other targets that, as ammunition depots, are spread out across Russia.
Bohnert lists rail yards and port infrastructure, and “many other dual-use facilities that might also be considered long-term targets.”
“So, instead of just hitting the depot, hitting the access points to the depot might be just as valuable in the longer term,” Bohnert added.
Over the past two years, drone production in Ukraine has scaled up a hundred times.
When the Army of Drones project was launched by the state in July 2022, seven Ukrainian manufacturers were able to supply drones to the state. As of August 2024, there are now 87 of them, according to the Digital Transformation Ministry.
In late September, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said that Ukraine plans to produce several million drones in 2025 to “prevent Russia from gaining an advantage in this area.” Meanwhile, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on Oct. 1 that Ukraine can produce four million drones annually.
Some of Ukraine’s most successful attacks against Russia were carried out using the so-called “drone swarm” tactic when Ukrainian forces launched dozens of drones at once, which can now travel over 1,500 kilometers (933 miles), to overload the Russian air defense system.
According to Bohnert, “there’s a significant bottleneck” in Russia when it comes to producing additional air defense systems.
“Given how many air defenses have been at the front protecting front-line troops, Russia simply doesn’t have enough air defense systems to cover all its (valuable) locations. So, if it’s going to defend any depots better, it will have to take air defense systems either from the front or from protecting (Vladimir) Putin or other critical infrastructure,” the expert added.
According to Bohnert, Russia must start from scratch regarding its air defense. It was mainly designed to defend against high-altitude air targets, like fighter jets, but not against cruise missiles or drones that maneuver at low altitudes.
Another problem that Russia hasn’t yet solved is the vast territory that the air defense now must cover.
“Russia needs three times as many air defense systems as it has now. We’re talking about thousands of systems,” Bohnert said, adding that improving air defense could take a long time.
Strikes on facilities in the Russian towns of Tikhoretsk and Toropets destroyed a tonnage that is considered “the largest loss of ammunition” in Russia during the all-out war in Ukraine, the U.K. Defense Ministry said in its intelligence report.
One of Ukraine’s latest strikes on Sept. 29 targeted another arsenal in the Russian village of Kotluban, as confirmed by Ukraine’s General Staff. However, according to the satellite imagery, the strike did not directly hit the depot.
Despite the lack of visible damage on satellite imagery, the strike could still make the facility more vulnerable to further attacks and affect its logistics, which also influences the waging of war, Bohnert said.
“If you launch 10 strikes with drones, and then the facility can’t unload or store new munitions for 5 hours, 6 hours, or 8 hours, by itself, it is a major effect because that facility isn’t working for a day. It might not have damaged anything, but it’s still going to have a battlefield impact because those munitions aren’t going to reach the front line,” he added.
In early October, Ukraine’s Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk mentioned on national television that Russian forces still have an advantage in the amount of artillery shells used on the front line. However, according to him, the ratio has decreased nearly threefold since the start of the year, from 1:8 to 1:3.
Russia already adjusted its logistics at the tactical and operational levels after Ukraine targeted Russian military sites with HIMARS strikes in late 2022, Federico Borsari, a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), told the Kyiv Independent.
“However, large, strategically relevant depots were not moved because they were not considered under serious threat, especially given Ukraine’s lack of high-end, long-range precision strike capabilities and the prohibition of using Western-donated weapons against targets deep into Russian territory,” Borsari added.
The expert noted that Ukrainian strikes on ammunition depots, which store significant amounts of equipment and require time and extensive resources to relocate, certainly impact Russian operations, especially if the equivalent of months of ammunition production, including “consumable artillery shells, sophisticated and expensive missiles,” is destroyed.
“This can create resupply issues for both Russian targeteers tasked with deep-strike missions and artillery units in areas of the front line that rely on that specific depot. As a result, the tempo of Russian offensive operations can slow down in the affected sectors while also decreasing the fire volume on Ukrainian troops,” Borsari added.
Yet, Russia is still continuing its offensive in Donetsk Oblast and is trying to conduct a counter-offensive in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, where Ukrainian troops control parts of the territory. On Oct. 1, Russia occupied Vuhledar, in Donetsk Oblast, a Ukrainian stronghold that the country successfully defended for over two years.
If Russia tries to continue its operations, it may lack logistical capacity, given its dependence on railways, specific arms depots. This could lead to a protracted problem with rerouting, which would reduce the efficiency of Russian strikes, according to Bohnert.
“It’s not declining fast enough to make a huge difference, but it might change over the next twelve months. Does this mean that Russia is going to stop? No, but it will reduce its effectiveness,” he said.